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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-Tort Claims Not
Within Admiralty Jurisdiction Unless Requisite
Maritime Nexus Exists
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article Ill of the Constitution' grants exclusive jurisdiction
in admiralty to the federal courts. The scope of this jurisdiction over
tort claims traditionally has depended upon the situs of the
tort-whether it occurred on land or on navigable water. 2 Although
most American courts have adhered to this "strict locality" test, it
has received frequent criticism as manifested by significant judicial
and legislative modifications over the years. 3 Most judicial challenges to the test have focused on its failure to require a connection
between the tortious occurrence and the traditional problems of
maritime commerce.' A majority of courts ostensibly continued to
apply the locality standard until 1972 when the United States Supreme Court for the first time explicitly addressed the issue of
whether maritime tort jurisdiction turned solely on maritime locality in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland5 and held
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ."Professor Black has suggested that Article III,
§ 2 "evidences a strong federal interest in the orderly and uniform judicial governance of the
concerns of the maritime industry . . . [since] the subject matter is the only one specifically
singled out for attention in the jurisdiction section. . . ." Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:
Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259, 262 (1950).
2. Admiralty jurisdiction has been applied only to occurrences on navigable water. See
notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967)
(action for injuries to diver from public pier not cognizable in admiralty); Campbell v. H.
Hackfeld & Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903) (tort must have a maritime nature before action
is cognizable in admiralty); Extension of Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972)
(action for injuries resulting from auto collision on floating landing not within admiralty);
Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) (action for injuries to
diver from public pier not cognizable in admiralty); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111
(S.D. Tex. 1968) (denying jurisdiction in case in which a forklift dropped into water when
boom of crane broke in process of raising forklift); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp.
866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (action for injuries to swimmer at public beach not within admiralty
jurisdiction).
5. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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that the wrong must bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity' for the federal courts to have admiralty juridiction. Subsequently, in Kelly v. Smith, 7 the Fifth Circuit implemented the new test articulated by the Supreme Court by analyzing
all the circumstances relating to an alleged tort in terms of four
relevant factors to determine whether a substantial maritime relationship existed. 8 Although thb court indicated that it had applied
the Executive Jet test in finding admiralty jurisdiction, its factor
analysis nevertheless seems to have placed undue emphasis on the
locality of the tort.
I1.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOCALITY TEST AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

Historically, the need for uniform administration of laws governing the unique customs and traditions of maritime commerce
precipitated the development of admiralty courts.9 The provision in
Article HI for exclusive federal jurisdiction in admiralty and the
implementing provisions of the Judiciary Act of 178910 reflect the
early American desire for uniformity in this area. Modern litigants
find admiralty jurisdiction attractive not only because it affords a
uniform body of law, but also because it provides numerous procedural and substantive advantages. It provides, inter alia, access to
federal courts in the absence of a federal question or diversity of
citizenship" and offers special substantive rules that can aid a litigant in presenting his case and recovering for his injury.'2 Before a
6. Id. at 268.
7. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. These factors were largely derived by the court from its earlier opinion in Peytavin
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 58 infra.
9. Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972);
McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Pelaez, Admiralty Tort
Jurisdiction-TheLast Barrier,7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1968). For a discussion of the
historical development of admiralty jurisdiction see DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 419-31
(No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). See also 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 96-97.
10. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
11. See, e.g., Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (admiralty claim allows access to federal courts despite lack of diversity between the parties); Note,
Admiralty Tort Jurisditionand Aircraft Accident Cases: Hops, Skips and Jumps into
Admiralty, 38 J. Am L. & COM. 53, 54 n.9 (1972).
12. The special rules include the following: contributory negligence is not a bar to
recovery, Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1970) (comparative negligence
rule used in admiralty litigation of mid-air collision); Note, supra note 11; assumption of risk
is often not recognized as a defense, King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335, 336 (E.D. Tenn.
1963) (action by injured water skier against boat operator held cognizable in admiralty where
assumption of risk is inapplicable); 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 95 n.1; and defendant is afforded some
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litigant can take advantage of these benefits, however, his claim
must satisfy the admiralty jurisdictional requirements. The strict
locality test traditionally has been applied to determine whether a
tort claim is cognizable in admiralty. 13 One of the early articulations
of the locality standard appears in Justice Story's opinion in the
leading case of Thomas v. Lane," in which the court held that a libel
for assault and battery and false imprisonment was not cognizable
in admiralty because of failure to allege a maritime locality. 5 In
1886 the Supreme Court definitively set forth the strict locality test
6 a case concerning a suit
in The Plymouth,"
for damages to a wharffront storehouse resulting from a fire that originated aboard a ship
moored alongside the wharf. Applying the strict locality test, the
Court held that despite the tort's maritime origin its substance and
consummation occurred on land, and the suit was not within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.1 7 The test expressed in
The Plymouth has been accepted by the weight of American authority,' X but its mechanical application has produced seemingly irreconcilable decisions based on attenuated distinctions," and consequently has engendered frequent criticism by commentators and
protection through liability limitations, Crenshaw, Airplanes in the Admiralty Jurisdiction:
A Short History, 18 S.C.L. REv. 572, 573-75 (1966). See generally Pelaez, supra note 9, at 38.
13. The test for jurisdiction over contract claims has always been whether the subject
matter has a maritime character. Philadelphia. W. & B.R.R. v. Philadelphia & Havre de
Grace Steam Towboat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209, 215 (1859); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418,
444 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
14. 23 F. Cas. 957 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
15. Much of the outgrowth of the locality rule stems from Justice Story's early analysis
of admiralty jurisdiction. In Thomas he stated: "In regard to torts I have always understood,
that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act."
Id. at 960. Similarly, in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), he
described maritime torts as being "necessarily bounded by locality." Id. at 444.
16. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
17. "[Tjhe true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine torts . . . [is] that
the wrong and injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas or
navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have taken
place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 34-35.
18. In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), an action brought by a longshoreman who was injured on a pier while loading cargo, the Court noted that the vast
majority of cases had been decided according to the strict locality test and supported its
determination that jurisdiction was lacking by citing 39 supporting cases. Id. at 205 n.2.
19. For example, jurisdiction was found lacking in the case of a longshoreman knocked
from a wharf into navigable water by a loaded sling. T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S.
179 (1928). The Court held an action within admiralty jurisdiction, however, in a case in
which a longshoreman unloading a ship in navigable water was knocked from the deck onto
the wharf by the ship's hoist. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
Compare Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), with The Admiral Peoples, 295
U.S. 649 (1935).
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numerous legislative and judicial modifications. Scholarly criticism
of locality as the exclusive determinant of admiralty jurisdiction
had occurred even before the Supreme Court's decision in The
Plymouth.2 0 Agreeing with earlier critics that jurisdiction should
depend upon a maritime nexus, several recent commentators have
suggested that a nexus requirement actually was satisfied sub
silentio in the early cases producing the same result that would have
been reached under a "locality plus maritime nexus" test.2' The
most cogent criticism of the locality test has been that its failure to
take into account the relationship of the tortious occurrence with
maritime commerce 22 renders the test fortuitous and arbitrary. Legislative dissatisfaction with results reached under the strict locality
test was manifested in the Extension of Admiralty Act,2 3 which
obviated the specific holding of The Plymouth by providing that
claims for personal injury or property damage on shore caused by a
vessel on navigable water are actionable in admiralty.24 Another
legislative modification was the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), 21 which creates a wrongful death action in admiralty for
20. E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, ITS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 308 (3d ed.
1894). In this treatise Judge Benedict questioned the propriety of the strict locality test: "It
may, however, be doubted whether the civil jurisdiction, in cases of torts, does not depend
upon the relation of the parties to a ship or vessel, embracing only those tortious violations
of maritime right and duty which occur in vessels, to which the admiralty jurisdiction, in
cases of contracts, applies." Id.
21. See Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Airplanes and Wrongful Deathin Territorial
Waters, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1084, 1091 (1964); Comment, Aviation Challenges Admiralty
Jurisdiction:Sink or Swim in the Sea of Uncertainty, 35 J. Am. L. & CoM. 616, 621 (1969).
See also Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967).
22. See Black, supra note 1, at 264; cf. Pelaez, supra note 9, at 41-42 (advocating
complete abandonment of any locality requirement). Contra, Note, Admiralty-Jurisdiction
over Airplane Crashes on Navigable Waters, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1569, 1583 (1972); Note, supra
note 11, at 64.
23. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970) provides, in part: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury
be done or consummated on land."
24. For a discussion of this point see 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 95. See Peytavin v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970). Section 761 provides: "Whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain
" For an
a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty ..
explanation of DOHSA see Note, Wrongful Death at Sea-The Death on the High Seas Act,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 389 (1963).
In 1970 the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
an action for wrongful death aboard a vessel within a marine league from shore, complemented DOHSA by creating an action for wrongful deaths that occur on navigable waters
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deaths occurring at sea more than one marine league from shore.
Although this statute does not address specifically the propriety of
the locality standard, its broad language has allowed the inclusion
of suits of a questionable maritime nature within admiralty jurisdiction. Judicial questioning of the strict locality test first appeared in
Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co.,6 in which a stevedore was injured
while loading a vessel anchored in navigable water. The Ninth Circuit construed the locality test as articulated in The Plymouth to
require that the tort have a maritime nature before the action can
be brought in admiralty." Eleven years later in Atlantic Transport
Co. v. Imbrovek2 8 the Supreme Court declined to determine the
soundness of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation; neither denouncing
nor endorsing the maritime-nexus approach, the Court remarked
that even if a nexus were required, the libelant had alleged a sufficiently maritime wrong to satisfy it."5 In recent years judicial reluctance to adopt a maritime-nexus requirement has diminished. In
McGuire v. City of New York, 3 a federal district court held that an
action for injuries sustained by a swimmer at a public beach was
not within admiralty jurisdiction because admiralty law historically
was not concerned with noncommercial activities. 3' In adopting a
locality plus maritime-nexus test, the court stated that the occurrence of a tort on navigable waters was only prima facie evidence of
admiralty jurisdiction. 3 Similarly, in Chapman v. City of Grosse
Pointe Farms,33 an action brought by a swimmer for injuries sustained while diving from a public pier into shallow water, the Sixth
Circuit held that in addition to a maritime locality, admiralty requires a relationship between the alleged wrong and some maritime
service, navigation, or commerce on navigable waters.3 1 More rewithin the DOHSA exclusionary limit. The Court overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886), in which it had been held that maritime law does not provide a cause of action for
wrongful death. 398 U.S. at 409. DOHSA and Moragne together provide a vehicle for wrongful
death recovery in admiralty when the jurisdictional requirements of admiralty are satisfied.
26. 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903).
27. Id. at 697. In arriving at its conclusion the Campbell court relied on Justice Story's
language in DeLovio v. Boit-the same as was used in The Plymouth in setting forth the strict
locality test. See note 15 supra.
28. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
29. Id. at 61.
30. 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
31. The court noted that the locality test was developed as a rule of limitation and as
a means of limiting the scope of admiralty jurisdiction; thus, libelant should not be able to
expand jurisdiction through its use. Id. at 869.
32. Id. at 870-71.
33. 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 966.
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cently, in Peytavin v. Government Employees Insurance Co.," the
Fifth Circuit considered whether admiralty jurisdiction existed over
an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision
that occurred on a floating ferry landing on navigable water. After
criticizing both the strict locality test and the locality plus maritime
connection test-the former for its susceptibility to differing applications and the latter for combining the imprecision of the locality
standard and the difficulty of determining what constitutes a minimum maritime connection sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction 36-the court concluded that no substantial maritime connection was shown by an analysis of the case's relevant factors and
consequently denied admiralty jurisdiction.37

III.

AVIATION TORTS AND EXECUTIVE JET AvIATION, INC. V.

CITY OF

CLEVELAND

The growth of the aviation industry has posed special problems
as many litigants have sought to bring claims arising from aviation
accidents within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. The courts
initially refused to extend this jurisdiction to cover aviation torts
because of doubts that the strict locality test was properly applicable and in deference to admiralty's traditional function of promoting seafaring commerce. In the 1914 case of The Crawford Bros. No.
2,11 a federal district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over an
action resulting from the crash of an airplane into navigable waters
on the ground that this new mode of transportation posed novel and
complex problems outside the traditional scope of admiralty. Although a few courts found that a seaplane is a "vessel" subject to
admiralty jurisdiction while it is engaged in seagoing functions, 3 the
35. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 1126.
37. Id. at 1127. Several other pre-Executive Jet decisions appear to have adopted a
maritime-nexus requirement sub silentio. See, e.g., O'Connor & Co. v. City of Pascagoula,
304 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (granting jurisdiction over an action for allegedly
tortious interference with loading and transportation of explosives by vessel and interference
with a shipping contract); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. 111, 114 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (denying
jurisdiction in a case in which a forklift dropped into water when boom of crane broke in
process of raising forklift).
38. 215 F. 269, 271 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Air Serv., Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935);
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 118, 133 N.E. 371,372 (1921). Contra,
United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Cal. 1943) (seaplane not a vessel); Noakes
v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (seaplane not a vessel). But cf.
United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (airplane not a vessel within
admiralty jurisdiction).
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greatest impetus for recognizing aviation torts in admiralty was
Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co.,1° in which a federal district
court interpreted DOHSA4 ' to cover a wrongful death action against
an airline-a position that has been adopted by a majority of the
courts confronted with the issue.4 2 In a later case, Wilson v. Transocean Airlines,4 3 another federal district court held that an action
for wrongful death resulting from an airplane crash on the high seas
was cognizable in admiralty under DOHSA because jurisdiction
depended only upon the locality of the tort and not upon the nature
or cause of it." Then, in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.," a
wrongful death action not within the province of DOHSA,48 the
Third Circuit, analogizing air travel to maritime commerce on the
basis of their common transportation function and noting that the
plight of a downed airplane is similar to that of a sinking ship,47 held
that the action was within admiralty jurisdiction because the tort
had a maritime locality. The Weinstein holding not only has been
adopted by courts faced with the same issue,48 but in some cases it
has been greatly expanded." Thus, despite the continuing debate
40.

1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The court did not discuss specifically the locality

test.
41. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., D'Aleman v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 259 F. 2d 493, 495-96 (2d Cir.
1958) (personal representative maintained suit under DOHSA for death caused by shock from
witnessing engine failure; DOHSA interpreted as applying to wrongful death in the airspace
over the high seas); Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D. Mass. 1951)
(DOHSA construed to apply to airplane crash); Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc.
963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), afl'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, appeal
denied, 293 N.Y. 878, 49 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1944) (action under DOHSA for mid-ocean airplane
crash). But see Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venzolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1957)
(questioning the constitutionality of such constructions of DOHSA).
43. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
44. "Admiralty tort jurisdiction has never depended upon the nature of the tort or how
it came about, but upon the locality where it occurred." Id. at 92. The court further noted
that "the tort is deemed to occur, not where the wrongful act or omission has its inception,
but where the impact of the act or omission produces such injury as to give rise to a cause of
action." Id. at 92 & n.27.
45. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
46. The action was not within DOHSA because it stemmed from an airplane crash into
state territorial waters.
47. 316 F.2d at 763.
48. See, e.g., Harris v. United Air Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Iowa 1967) (action
arising from crash into state territorial waters of Lake Michigan). See also Davis v. City of
Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (action maintained by swimmer
injured by a surf board), citing Weinstein for its use of the strict locality test.
49. See, e.g., Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (wrongful death action for crewmember's fall from jet airplane into navigable water cognizable in
admiralty); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (admiralty jurisdiction covers action for injury resulting from airplane's jolting while in airspace
over Atlantic Ocean).
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concerning the appropriate test for determining admiralty jurisdiction, the strict locality test was accepted by most courts in aviation
as well as nonaviation cases.
In Executive Jet, petitioner airlines brought an action in admiralty to recover damages for the negligent loss of a jet plane, alleging
that respondents' 0 negligence in failing to clear the runway or give
adequate warning caused the plane to collide with a flock of seagulls
on takeoff and consequently to crash into the adjacent Lake Erie.
Petitioner contended that the action was within the federal court's
admiralty jurisdiction 5' because the damage occurred on navigable
water. Respondents asserted, however, that the suit was not within
admiralty jurisdiction because the tort occurred on initial impact-when the plane struck the birds-and because petitioner's
activities did not have a sufficient relationship with maritime commerce. The Supreme Court 52 initially discussed the historical development of the strict locality test and the serious difficulties that had
resulted from its mechanical application to untraditional classes of
maritime torts. The Court noted that the results of its application
were inconsonant with the purposes of admiralty law. The Court
further considered the numerous judicial and legislative exceptions
to the test, especially in situations in which the tort bore a relationship to maritime commerce or navigation but had no maritime locality, as evidence that the requirement of a maritime nexus often
is more sensible than a strict application of the locality standard.
Proceeding to a consideration of the propriety of determining admiralty jurisdiction in aviation cases by relying on the locality test, the
Court recognized that the crash of an airplane into navigable water
is wholly fortuitous, particularly during intracontinental flights,
and that the precise location at which a tort occurs is very difficult
to determine in cases of air travel. The Court concluded, therefore,
that the requirement of a significant maritime nexus is a more
practical guide in determining admiralty jurisdiction in aviation
50. Named as defendants were the air traffic controller, the airport manager, and the
City of Cleveland.
51. Jurisdiction was grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1970), which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any
civil case of admiralty of maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled." Petitioner's only access to federal court was through
admiralty because there was no diversity of citizenship or federal question.
52. In an unreported opinion, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio had
applied a locality plus maritime-nexus test and found that neither requirement was satisfied.
See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1972). The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had affirmed solely on the basis of the strict locality test.
448 F.2d 151, 154 (1971).
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tort cases. Continuing its analysis, the Court acknowledged the similar problems faced by a downed airplane and a sinking ship, but
reasoned that the inherent differences in the two modes of transportation render inappropriate the application to aviation torts of rules
developed to deal exclusively with seagoing vessels. Finally, the
Court noted that if uniformity in the treatment of aviation accidents
is needed, the responsibility lies with Congress to act under its
commerce power. Thus, the Court concluded that neither the crash
of an intracontinental airplane into navigable water nor the occurrence of the negligent act while the plane is in flight establishes a
maritime nexus sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.

IV.

KELLY V. SMITH

In Kelly, plaintiff hunters, who were the pilot and passengers
of an outboard motorboat on the navigable waters of the Mississippi
River, brought an action for assault and battery for personal injuries
53
sustained from rifle shots fired from shore by defendant caretakers
during plaintiffs' sudden departure from a privately owned island. 4
Plaintiffs brought the suit in federal district court more than five
years after the incident, alleging diversity of citizenship and admiralty jurisdiction. Defendants contended that the action should be
dismissed because diversity actions are barred by a Mississippi oneyear statute of limitations for assault and battery actions 5 and because admiralty jurisdiction was lacking. After a nonjury trial, the
district court rendered judgment for plaintiffs. 6 On appeal, 57 the
Fifth Circuit, considering the controverted issue of admiralty jurisdiction, discussed the recent adoption of the maritime-nexus re53. Named as defendants were the owner of the island, an Arkansas land management
corporation to which the owner had granted a license for exclusive hunting rights on the
island, a hunting club that had been the hunting rights licensee prior to the corporation, the
caretaker, and his assistant.
54. Plaintiffs, residents of Mississippi, had crossed the river to engage in some clandestine deer hunting on a privately owned island on the west side of the main channel. They
were fired upon as they attempted to flee by motorboat back across the river after they had
been discovered by the island's caretaker and his assistant.
55. Miss. CODE ANN. § 732 (1942).
56. The previous licensee was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment and the
owner of the island was absolved of liability at trial. The remaining defendants were held
liable.
57. The allegation of diversity of citizenship failed because the Mississippi one-year
statute of limitations for assault and battery actions was applicable. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d
520, 523 (5th Cir. 1973). In addition to the issue of jurisdiction, defendants contended on
appeal that plaintiffs were barred by laches, and defendant licensee contended that it could
not be held vicariously liable for the acts of other defendants. The court resolved both of these
issues in favor of plaintiffs. Id. at 526.
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quirement by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet and by the Fifth
Circuit in Peytavin. Relying on those two cases, the court concluded
that maritime location alone is not sufficient to sustain admiralty
jurisdiction and that the alleged wrong must bear a substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activities. In determining what
constitutes such a relationship, the court decided that the following
factors were to be considered: the functions and roles of the parties;
the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation
and type of the injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. 8 The court reasoned that since the party most seriously
injured was the pilot and the vehicle concerned was a watercraft,
and since firearms and gunshot wounds are not precluded from
having a maritime connection, then admiralty's traditional concern
with providing remedies for injuries on navigable waters required
the exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, on policy grounds the
court argued that the wounding of a vessel's pilot on a major commercial waterway presents dangers sufficient for the assumption of
admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court concluded that when
occupants of a vessel on navigable water are injured from rifle shots
fired by parties on shore, a significant relationship with maritime
activity sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction exists. The dissent-9 agreed that the four factors enumerated by the court were
important considerations but argued that an additional factor-the
state's interest-should also be weighed. Noting that state substantive rules would apply if the case had been decided on diversity
grounds and that the action would have been barred by the state's
statute of limitations, the dissent argued that admiralty jurisdiction
should not be employed to deprive the state of its control over the
action unless the federal interest in uniformity outweighs the state's
interest in having its own laws applied. Emphasizing the essentially
local nature of the tort and the traditional commercial purposes of
admiralty law, the dissent concluded that there was no overriding
federal interest in the matter.
V.

THE MEANING OF THE MARITIME-NEXUS REQUIREMENT

The Supreme Court's adoption of a maritime-nexus require58. Id. at 525. These factors were discerned largely from the court's analysis of the
Peytavin opinion. See Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1972). For an analysis of Peytavinthat discerns a slightly different list of factors see Note,
New Guidelines for Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction,48 IND. L.J. 87, 99-103 (1972).
59. 485 F.2d at 527.
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ment in Executive Jet represents a significant realignment of admiralty tort jurisdiction with the purposes it was originally designed
to serve. 0 This realignment, however, was incomplete, for the Court
left several problems unresolved.6 ' First, the Court did not state
clearly whether the new maritime-nexus requirement is a complete
replacement of the strict locality test or merely an addition to it.6'
In many cases this ambiguity would not cause significant problems
because the question whether the wrong had occurred on land or on
navigable water would be easily determinable. But in other cases,
such as actions for injuries to longshoremen, 3 there may be an obvious maritime connection but not a maritime locality. Despite this
ambiguity, a number of lower courts apparently have construed
Executive Jet as setting forth a "locality plus maritime nexus" test
in which maritime locality is still a prerequisite to jurisdiction.64
Secondly, the opinion fails to provide formal guidelines to be applied in determining when there is a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. The peculiarity of the problems raised
in aviation tort cases may partially explain the absence of guidelines
that could be applied by lower courts in nonaviation cases. Although Executive Jet has been interpreted to apply to nonaviation
60. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
61. Executive Jet raises a number of aviation-related problems that are beyond the
scope of this Comment. For example, although the Supreme Court expressly left open the
question whether an aviation tort will ever bear a relationship to traditional maritime activity
sufficient to invoke admiralty, it indicated in a footnote that admiralty "clearly" is available
to claimants under DOHSA. 409 U.S. at 271 n.20. This language suggests the possibility of
the kind of fortuitous results for which the Court condemned the strict locality test. Whether
an intracontinental flight from Miami to New York crashes within or without the one-marinemile limit of DOHSA and whether such a crash results in death or personal injury are
fortuitous circumstances. For a discussion of this and other problems of Executive Jet see
Bell, Admiralty Jurisdictionin the Wake of Executive Jet, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 67 (1973).
62. The Court declined to decide whether the tort had a maritime locality because its
holding that there was no maritime nexus was dispositive of the case without deciding locality. The Court noted that the positions of both parties gave rise "to the problems inherent in
applying the strict locality test of admiralty tort jurisdiction in aviation accident cases." 409
U.S. at 267. This could be interpreted as a complete rejection of the locality standard at least
in aviation cases. On the other hand, the court also stated: "[W]e have concluded that
maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort
cases." Id. at 261 (emphasis added). This statement might suggest that the locality standard
was retained.
63. See note 19 supra.
64. See, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973) (claims for
property damage and for interference with right of navigation resulting from oil spill held
cognizable in admiralty); Rubin v. Power Authority of New York, 356 F. Supp. 1169, 1171
(W.D.N.Y. 1973) (action brought against operator of power plant for deaths of divers in
navigable water held not within admiralty jurisdiction); Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355
F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (D. St. Thom. & St. John 1973) (personal injury claim arising out of
crash of seaplane during takeoff held cognizable in admiralty).
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tort actions,"5 in at least one lower court case, the ambiguities of the
opinion have contributed to a finding that "navigable waters" is no
longer a necessary condition for admiralty jurisdiction' 6 -a construction that the Supreme Court probably did not envision.
By listing a number of factors that should be considered in
determining admiralty jurisdiction, the Kelly case filled some of the
gaps left by Executive Jet. A close reading of the Kelly opinion
suggests that it is not necessary that each factor evidence a maritime nexus, but rather that a weighing of all the factors show such
a nexus. For example, the court did not find that the cause and
nature of the injury or the instrumentality-the firearm-were related to maritime activity; it found only that they were "not so
inherently indigenous to land as to preclude any maritime connection. " 7 When these factors were balanced with the remaining ones,
which the court found to be related to maritime activity, the court
concluded that the total situation showed a maritime nexus. The
Kelly formulation therefore contains a degree of flexibility necessary
in an area in which so many borderline cases render an absolute test,
such as the strict locality test, almost meaningless. Despite its significance as the first case to give definite content to the maritimenexus requirement, Kelly's balancing of factors, especially the interpretation and application of the "traditional concepts of the role of
admiralty law" factor, is objectionable because of its undue emphasis on locality. The court found that the factual situation in Kelly
came within those traditional concepts because admiralty traditionally has been concerned with providing remedies for those injured
while traveling navigable waters." While this reasoning is not incorrect, many courts and commentators would qualify it by adding
that the injuries must bear a substantial relationship to maritime
commerce or the shipping industry."9 Another post-Executive Jet
case, Crosson v. Vance, 70 offers some guidance on this point. In that
case, the Fourth Circuit, construing Executive Jet as a rejection of
earlier assumptions that injuries resulting from the operation of
65. See note 64 supra.
66. In Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont. 1973), the court said
that in Executive Jet the Supreme Court had "diminished the binding force of the label
'navigable water' and freed the courts to make a wider inquiry into the admiralty jurisdiction
problem." Id. See Bell, supra note 61, at 78-79.
67. 485 F.2d at 526.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir.
1967); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Pelaez, supra
note 9, at 42-43; Note, supra note 58, at 103-04.
70. 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973).
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small, noncommercial boats on navigable waters were within admiralty jurisdiction, 7 ' held that an action by an injured water skier
against the allegedly negligent pilot of the towing boat was not
cognizable in admiralty. This holding was based on the court's reasoning that the traditional concerns of admiralty-commercial vessels engaged in interstate and foreign shipping-were not related to
the action before the court.72 The dissenting judge in Kelly made
this point by arguing that the federal interest in the uniform treatment of interstate and foreign commerce on water is not served by
extending admiralty jurisdiction to include torts that occur on water
but are of only a local nature.13 The court's statement that the
incident presented sufficient danger to maritime commerce appears
to be an argument based on the potentiality of interference with
commerce rather than on any actual interference. A further objection is that the list of factors in Kelly appears to be incomplete. The
dissent correctly pointed out that the state was deprived of its control over an action for a tort essentially local in nature-a tort that
would have been a purely local concern had it occurred on the island
before plaintiffs could escape. In such cases, courts should consider
the state interest as a factor, and when a significant relationship to
maritime commerce or shipping does not exist, the state interest
should be found to outweigh the minimal federal interest in the
subject. Furthermore, the locality of the tort should be viewed as
simply one of the factors to be taken into consideration in determining admiralty jurisdiction. The Kelly opinion suffers from the same
ambiguity as does the Executive Jet opinion-a failure to clarify the
status of the locality standard. In view of the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Executive Jet that the situs of a tort often is completely fortuitous the locality standard should be given no more
weight than each of the other factors listed by the Fifth Circuit.
Some commentators have argued that the locality of the tort should
be given no consideration at all. 4 Acceptance of a test based solely
on maritime nexus, however, without any consideration of locality
would be a step further than many courts are willing to go. Moreover, locality will normally be an important factual consideration
since admiralty law concerns commerce that is related substantially
71. In Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953), and Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406
(1943), the Supreme Court, without specifically considering the issue of admiralty tort jurisdiction, applied admiralty rules to damages resulting from collisions of pleasure boats.
72. 484 F.2d at 840.
73. 485 F.2d at 527.
74. See Pelaez, supra note 9, at 41-43.
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to navigable water. Therefore, retention of locality as one of many
factors to be weighed is the preferable solution. The Fifth Circuit's
factor analysis offers a sensible approach to the problem of deter,mining whether an action is within admiralty jurisdiction, but a
factor analysis should not be a mechanical operation leading to
jurisdiction over an action for injuries simply because the tort fortuitously occurred on navigable waters and concerned passengers in
a boat as in Kelly. The achievement of correct results will depend
on the court's balancing of all relevant factors, with particular emphasis being placed on admiralty's traditional role of protecting and
promoting maritime commerce and shipping.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The frequent criticism of the strict locality test as the sole
determinant of admiralty jurisdiction resulted in the Supreme
Court's requirement of a significant relationship with traditional
maritime activity in Executive Jet. The Court's failure to give lucid
guidance to later courts in applying the new requirement in nonaviation cases was partially remedied by the Fifth Circuit's implementation of the maritime-nexus test utilizing a factor analysis in
Kelly. For those courts that follow Kelly, this new interpretation of
the test will provide needed guidelines for determining when admiralty should properly exercise jurisdiction. The courts should not
limit themselves, however, to a consideration of the four factors as
interpreted in Kelly, but should also balance the state interest in
having its local law apply against the federal interest in uniformity.
Although locality should be a factor to be considered, it should not
be unduly emphasized. The paramount consideration should be
that admiralty law is designed primarily to deal with the problems
of maritime commerce.

